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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO
Ngansi Magdalene Sauer,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Supreme Court Case No. 44417
Jefferson County
Case No. CV-15-2015-0024

vs.

Jefferson County; and Jefferson County
Sheriff's Department, a Division
thereof; and Officer John Clements, as
an Agent of the Jefferson County Sheriff's
Office,

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Defendants/Respondents.

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Jefferson County.
Honorable Alan C. Stephens, District Judge presiding.

Dean C. Brandstetter, Esq.
James A. Herring, Esq.
Cox, Ohman & Brandstetter, Chtd.
P.O. Box 51600
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1600
(208) 522-8606
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant

Blake G. Hall, Esq.
Hall Angell Starnes, LLP
1075 S. UtahAve., Suite 150
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
(208) 522-3003
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents
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summary judgment in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff is appealing only the award of attorney
fees, based on the trial court's errors oflaw, abuse of discretion, and failure to make specific
findings of fact. Plaintiff requests that the Judgment be reversed in its entirety.
The relevant background is as follows: the Plaintiff, Ms. Sauer, was forcibly removed
from her vehicle and arrested by Defendant Officer John Clements, an agent of Defendant
Jefferson County Sheriff's Department. See R. pp. 153-157. This forcible removal and arrest
occurred in the context of a traffic stop on January 16, 2013. See R. pp. 153-157. The charges
against Ms. Sauer were ultimately dismissed on motion of the prosecutor. R. p. 295,

~

20.

Ms. Sauer hired a private investigator, who informed Ms. Sauer that Officer Clements
fabricated the reasonable suspicion for her stop, and probable cause for her arrest (ostensibly
R. pp.260-268. Ms. Sauer then brought suit against the Defendants,

for "eluding").

alleging in relevant part that Officer Clements applied excessive force and falsely
imprisoned her, both of which are violations of her federal constitutional rights; and that she
was entitled to relief under 42

§ 1983. R. pp. 14-16.

Following substantial discovery, the Defendants moved for summary judgment on the
basis that Ms. Sauer could not prove her claims, and that Defendants were entitled to
qualified immunity. R. pp. 151-176. The trial court agreed (based largely on the court's
improper weighing of conflicting evidence) and summary judgment was granted.
R. pp. 689-702.

Defendants then filed a Afemoranclum ofAuthority in Support of

and Attorneys·

Against Plaintiff; claiming ( l) that Ms. Sauer brought her state law claims in "bad

faith," entitling Defendants to attorney fees for defending the state claims: and
that Plaintiff's federal lav,r claims were unsupportable, but without

any particular
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in this litigation."

p. 724.

Sauer timely moved to disallow the attorney fees on the

basis that Defendants had not proven that Ms. Sauer brought her state law claims in "bad
faith," or her federal lmv claims ''frivolously." R. pp. 751-753.
The trial court heard Ms. Sauer's motion to disallow attorney fees on June 20, 2016.
During the hearing, the court invited discussion and arguments about the proper standards
for awarding attorney fees. Tr. p. 15-16. The court understood that there were two different
standards for the award of attorney fees under state and federal law. In order to be entitled
to the attorney fees incurred in defending the state law claim the Defendants had to establish
that Ms. Sauer brought the case in bad faith, yet to be entitled to attorney fees incurred in
defending the federal law claim, the Defendants had to prove that Plaintiff brought and/or
pursued the same frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. The court pai1icularly
struggled with the question of how to award fees only for the defense of one of the two sets
of claims. Tr. pp. 14-16. Counsel for Ms. Sauer argued that because Defendants had not
apportioned their fees between the defense of the state claims and the defense of the federal
claims, there should be no award if fees were allowable for only one of the two sets of claims.
Tr. p. 9. Defendants' counsel argued contrarily that because the claims were all inseparably
·'intertwined," the

could not be segregated and all of Defendants'

should be

allowable. Tr. pp. 13-14.
award in part. Without making any findings of
fact the court concluded that although the state law claims were not brought in "bad faith,"
the federal claims were brought "frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation."
pp.

The court then recognized the question of ·\vhat should happen when the

prevailing party fails to distinguish between the State Lav.T Claims and the 1983 claim in the
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claimed were allocable to the§ 1983 claim. The court believed ·'that an award of this amount
was within its discretion and best divides the fees, absent additional evidence.'' R. p. 767.

Msw Sauer timely requested a final judgment, and filed tl1is appeal frorn. the a'vvard of attorney
fees only.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by applying an incorrect standard for fee
awards and allocating 50% of the Defendants' fees to the allowable claim?
B. Whether an award of attorney fees under 42 USC § 1988 has been precluded by the
evidence that all of the claims were ''completely intertwined?"
C. \Vhether the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the award of
attorney fees requires reversal of the Judgment Re Attorney Fees?
ARGUMENT
The Judgment Re Attorney Fees should be reversed without remand. The failure of the
trial court to make findings of fact, by itself: necessitates reversal. Further however, the trial
court abused its discretion by failing to apply the correct standard for awarding fees under
42 USC § 1988, and the evidence and arguments in the record preclude Defendants from
proving their claim for fees under the correct standard. Because Defendants cannot prove
their attorney fee claim. remand would be futile.

A. The trial court abused its discretion by failing to apply the correct standard for
awarding fees under 42 USC §1983.
A party that successfully defends a civil rights case brought under 42 USC § 1983 may
recover attorney

under 42

§ 1988 only if the case was brought frivolously,

unreasonably, or without foundation. C. W

v.

School, 779 F.

No. 44417
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l
2007). A case is frivolous ·'only when the result is obvious,

P.

or the claim lacks legal

foundation. C. W ex rel K.S., 779 F. 3d at 963. "Attorneys' fees in civil rights cases should

only be a\varded to a defendant in exceptional circt1mstances." Bctrry v. 1-llo1vler\ 902 F. 2d
770, 773 (9th Cir. 1990). A claim is not "frivolous" merely because the defendant ultimately
prevailed. "It is important that a district court resist the understandable temptation to engage
in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevaiL his
action must have been unreasonable or without foundation." C. W ex rel K.S., 779 F. 3d at
963; Christiansburg, 434 lJ.S. at 422. Allegations that, upon careful examination, prove
legally insufficient to require a trial are not, for that reason alone, ·'groundless" or "without
foundation". Hughes v. Rowe. 449 U

5, 15--16, 101 S. Ct. 173, 179, 66 L. Ed. 2d 163

( 1980).

If a claim is determined to be frivolous, the prevailing defendant then has the burden of
for which it is asking are in fact incurred solely by virtue of the

·'establishing that the

words, the defendant may receive ·'only the portion of his fees that he would not have paid
the frivolous claim. Fox v. Vice, 131 S.Ct. 2205,

15 (2011) (emphasis added).

The trial court concluded that Ms. Sauer·s § 1983 claims were frivolous, but did not
apply the foregoing tests. In fact, it did not apply any tests, or make any necessary findings
but
~

arbitrarily allocated

requested to the defense

the

1983 claim without stating any basis other than ·'discretion." In fact, the trial court even

pointed out that it lacked the '·further evidence·' it would need to base its decision upon
reason.
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have accrued but for the frivolous claim. And the appeals court must determine whether the
trial court asked and answered that question, rather than some other. A trial court has wide
discretion 'Arhen, but on1y \vhen~ it calls the game by the right rules." _f?ox, 131 S. Ct~ at 2216-

17. A failure to do so is error, and an abuse of discretion. Id at 2216.

B. There is no evidence in the record to support an award of fees under 42 USC
§ 1988, in any amount, and so the award of fees should be reversed without

remand.
Defendants argued that their work defending the federal claims was "completely
intertwined" with and could not be segregated from their work defending the state law
claims, for which the trial court did not award fees. This admission precludes any argument
they might bring, on appeal or on remand, that the trial court could have correctly awarded
fees under § 1988.
When a trial court fails to make necessary findings to support its conclusion, the usual
result is a reversal by the appellate court with remand to make those necessary findings.
However, if there is no evidence in the record on appeal that would support any additional
findings the court could make on remand to support its judgment, then remand is futile, and
the judgment is simply reversed. Pope v. Jntermountain Gas Co., 646 P.2d 988, 996 (1982).
In this case, the statements and arguments of Defendants in the record preclude their
claim for

under § 1988. On remand. Defendants would have the burden of proving that

they would not have incurred the claimed fees butj<Jr Ms. Sauer's allegedly frivolous federal
claims. However. they admitted the exact opposite: that the state and federal claims were
'"completely intertwined," Tr. p. 13, IL l 1-1 · that ·'[t]hey overlap,'' Tr. p. 13, L 1

and '·all

the work that was done in this case was done for both the state claim and the federal claims,
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for which fees were not allowed. There is no possibility that they can prove the exact
opposite now: that the claimed fees would not have been incurred but for the allegedly

frivolous federal claims. Because Defendants have no possibilit)' of proving their fees under
the correct standard, remand would be futile.

C. The trial court's failure to make appropriate findings of fact, by itself,

necessitates reversal.
The trial court made no findings of fact, and only the bare minimum legal conclusions,
in its Judiment Re Attorney Fees. This failure alone requires reversal of the Judgment.
"When the court sits as the trier of fact, it is charged with the duty of preparing findings of
fact and conclusions of law m support of the decision which it reaches." Pope v.

Intermountain Gas

, 646 P.2d 988,996 (1982); I.R.C.P 52(a). The purpose of this duty is

to afford the appellate court a clear understanding of the basis of the trial court's decision.

Pope, 646 P.2d at 996. "The absence of findings and conclusions may be disregarded by the
appellate court only where the record is clear, and yields an obvious answer to the relevant
question. Id. (emphasis in original). "Absent such circumstances, the failure of the trial court
to make findings of fact and conclusions oflaw ... will necessitate a reversal of the judgment
and remand for additional findings and conclusions, unless such findings and conclusions
would not affect the judgment entered." Id.
failure

a trial court to make

findings of fact,

necessitates

It need not be compounded with any other error. ··rn failing to make its own
the trial court erred ....

to be vacated .... ,. Idaho
849 (Idaho 1

that reason alone, the judgment of the trial court would

Bank v. Bliss Valley FoodY, Inc., 824 P. 2d 84 L

1).
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findings of fact whatsoever to support that conclusion. R., p. 766-767. The trial court further
determined that 50% of the total fees requested were allocable to the § 1983 claim, again,
withrn1t m,ikipg

findings of fact or delineating an;1 basis for the conclusion.

R~~

p~ 766

767. Apparently, the trial court believed that it had "discretion" to arbitrarily allocate the fees
"absent additional evidence." R., p. 767. This was a clear dereliction of the trial court's duty
to make findings of fact under I.R.C.P. 52(a). This failure alone necessitates a reversal of the

Judgment Re Attorney Fees.
CONCLUSION
Because of the above-described errors by the trial court, and the Defendants' admissions
that preclude the finding of necessary support for the judgment on remand, the Plaintiff
respectfully requests that this court reverse the trial court's Judgment Re Attorney Fees
without remand.

James A. Herring, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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foregoing in

United States mail with postage prepaid to the fi)llowing parties at the

addresses set forth below:

Blake G. Hall, Esq.
Hall Angell Starnes, LLP
1075 S. Utah Ave., Suite 150
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

Clerk of the [daho Supreme Court
P.O.Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720

Dated this ___ day

James A. Herring. Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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